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Abstract 
We discuss comorbidity, continuity and discontinuity of anxiety-related disorders 
from the perspective of a two-dimensional neuropsychology of fear (threat avoidance) and 
anxiety (threat approach). Pharmacological dissection of the ‘neurotic’ disorders justifies 
both a categorical division between fear and anxiety and a subdivision of each mapped to a 
hierarchy of neural modules that process different immediacies of threat. On this view, 
‘anxiety’ and ‘fear’ disorders are absolutely distinct classes and so the American Psychiatric 
Association ‘anxiety-related disorders’ or World Health Organization ‘neurotic, stress-related 
and somatoform disorders’ are inappropriate conflations. Critically, each module within a 
hierarchy can generate normal responses, symptoms of another syndrome, or syndromal 
responses. We discuss the resultant possibilities for comorbid dysfunction of these modules 
both with each other and with some disorders not usually classified as anxiety-related. The 
simplest case is symptomatic fear/anxiety co-morbidity, where dysfunction in one module 
results in excess activity in a second, otherwise normal, module to generate symptoms and 
apparent co-morbidity. More complex is syndromal fear/anxiety co-morbidity, where more 
than one module is concurrently dysfunctional. Yet more complex are syndromal 
comorbidities of anxiety that go beyond the two dimensional fear/anxiety systems: 
Depression, SUD, and ADHD. Our account of ADHD-anxiety comorbidity entails discussion 
of the neuropsychology of externalizing disorders to account for the lack of anxiety 
comorbidity in some of these. Finally, we link the neuropsychology of disorder to personality 
variation, and to the development of a biomarker of variation in the anxiety system among 
individuals that, if extreme, may provide a means of unambiguously identifying the first of a 
range of anxiety syndromes. Such biomarkers are what is required if both morbidity and 
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comorbidity are to be approached via the Research Domain Criteria currently advocated by 
the National Institutes of Mental Health. 
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Introduction 
We address comorbidity, continuity and discontinuity of anxiety-related disorders 
both with each other and with some disorders not usually classified as anxiety-related. 
Current symptom-based classifications of mental disorders emphasise discrete and unitary 
diagnoses. But our analysis, grounded in neuropsychology, not only expects symptoms to be 
mixed, even in the absence of true syndromal comorbidity, but also expects some syndromes 
to co-occur more often than chance, either as a result of common risk factors or by feeding 
off each other in a vicious pathological cycle (which can involve both physiological and 
psychological elements). 
 We distinguish three distinct ways in which anxious and fearful states can occur: 
normal, symptomatic, and syndromal. Consider panic as an example. In the normal case, the 
panic state occurs in the face of a very high level of immediate threat in the environment and 
is, in a general evolutionary sense, adaptive. In the symptomatic case, the external level of 
threat would be lower and below the normal threshold for adaptive panic; but the panic could 
still be seen as appropriate provided we allow for the level of (pathological, syndromal) fear 
or anxiety experienced. In the syndromal case, the panic response itself would be excessive in 
relation to the modest level of threat and of (normal) fear or anxiety – or panic would occur 
spontaneously as a result of epileptiform discharges in its control module that are unrelated to 
any fear or anxiety input.  
We also categorically distinguish anxiety from fear, seeing them as functional 
opposites. In particular, we argue that pharmacology requires a complete separation of 
anxiety (involved in the approach to threat) from fear (involved in escape and the active 
avoidance of threat). In addition, we argue for multiple distinct disorders (that depend on the 
immediacy of threat) of each of fear and anxiety. On this view, ‘anxiety disorders’ and ‘fear 
disorders’ are classes of disorders and are absolutely distinct from each other; and the current 
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classes of ‘anxiety-related disorders’(American Psychiatric Association, 2013) or ‘neurotic, 
stress-related and somatoform disorders’(World Health Organization, 2010) conflate fear and 
anxiety inappropriately.  
From our anxiety-versus-fear perspective, what are commonly seen as anxiety-related 
disorders include what are in our terms ‘fear’ disorders (e.g., panic disorder, OCD); while 
some ‘fear’ disorders (in the sense of being labelled as phobias) are better seen as anxiety 
disorders (e.g., social phobia, which is now often referred to as social anxiety, or 
agoraphobia). Diagnostic systems, such as DSM-5, not only include fear and anxiety within a 
single category of ‘anxiety disorders’ but entangle fear and anxiety together; for example, 
 
“Anxiety disorders include disorders that share features of excessive fear and anxiety 
and related behavioural disturbances. Fear is the emotional response to real or 
perceived imminent threat, whereas anxiety is anticipation of future threat. Obviously 
these states overlap. … Panic attacks feature prominently within the anxiety disorders 
as a particular type of fear response. Panic attacks are not limited to anxiety disorders 
but rather can be seen in other mental disorders as well.” (DSM-5, 2013, p. 826) 
 
At the level of symptom presentation, the DSM-5 picture seems reasonable. But we 
believe this is a (scientific) confusion that has roots entangled deep in the psychological and 
psychiatric literature: Where ‘anxiety’ is often seen as a cognitively enhanced form of ‘fear’. 
In one sense, this is not far from our theory. Anxiety includes activation of the avoidance 
system and is more complex in also including activation of the approach system and, 
critically, in engaging mechanisms that allow conflict resolution. But, crucially, we draw 
attention to the functional opposition between fear and anxiety – where not only do they 
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represent quite distinct evolutionary adaptations but also activation of the anxiety system can 
suppress outputs of the fear system, such as panic (Deakin & Graeff, 1991).  
However, there are also good reasons for grouping anxiety and fear disorders (and 
also depression) into a higher order grouping of ‘neurotic disorders’ linked to high levels of 
the personality trait of neuroticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964; Andrews, Stewart, Morris-
Yates, Holt, & Henderson, 1990; Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, & Eaves, 1992a, b). Here 
we are close to the ICD-10 ‘neurotic, stress-related and somatoform disorders’ except for our 
categorical distinction between classes of fear, anxiety and depression disorder within the 
higher order ‘neurotic’ class. Importantly, high neuroticism is not itself a disorder. Instead a 
high level of neuroticism increases the risk of developing any one of a range of defensive 
disorders that include anxiety, fear and depression. Given the above evidence, Neuroticism 
may also be responsible for some of the comorbidity and shared genetic predisposing factors 
of defensive disorders. We leave open the question of whether ‘neurosis’ is still a useful 
clinical category when applied to a diffuse co-activated cluster of symptoms that do not lend 
themselves to distinct clinical subdivision. But there is now strong molecular genetic 
evidence for a general trait of neuroticism, as measured by normally distributed personality 
scales (Smith et al. 2015). We note below that the widespread modulation of brain systems by 
monoamines provides one possible substrate for such a global source of comorbidity and 
genetic influence. 
We will use the terms ‘panic’ and ‘obsession’ to refer to states in a generally similar 
way to their common usage; but we will treat their pure syndromal occurrences as primary 
fear disorders that can result in (see below), and usually present in the clinic with, 
symptomatic or syndromal comorbid anxiety. According to this perspective, symptoms are a 
poor guide to syndromes and in many clinical cases there will be apparent comorbidity of, for 
example, panic disorder with anxiety disorder when only panic or anxiety is syndromal and 
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anxiety or panic, respectively, is symptomatic. There will also often be genuine syndromal 
comorbidity. Our neuropsychological perspective (see below) leads to a hierarchical, system-
based, scheme that incorporates overlapping and interacting causes of different disorders and 
accounts for patterns of comorbidity among a range of defensive disorders.  
We emphasise the links between psychology and neurobiology in psychopathology. 
In particular, we will look at the multiple ways that psychological and neurobiological factors 
can interact in generating symptoms. The clinician is faced with co-occurring symptom 
clusters. Our primary task, here, is to account for the specific neural modules that define 
continuity and discontinuity of the specific anxiety-related clinical syndromes that can 
generate such shared clusters. Equally important, both in terms of basic theory and clinical 
implications, is how anxiety-related disorders interface with a range of other types of 
disorder. We will argue for a range of local symptomatic and syndromal ways in which co-
occurring clusters of symptoms can be produced. But we will also argue for a global level at 
which higher level risk factors (not pathological in and of themselves) can be common to 
defensive disorders and so can generate comorbidity; and we will link this to an older 
literature on more general classes of disorder (e.g., ‘neurosis’ and ‘hysteria’) that have 
modern echoes (e.g., ‘internalising’ and ‘externalising’). In addition to comorbidity among 
defensive disorders, we describe links to externalising disorders, such as substance use 
disorder (SUD) and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), that, on the face of it, 
one might not expect to be directly related to internalising disorders such as anxiety. 
  We also emphasise that comorbidity between two disorders can be generated in 
either direction.  In the case of anxiety and SUD, alcohol abuse, for example, is often a form 
of self-medication for stress-induced anxiety. Indeed, in the past, a primary social anxiety 
may often have been misdiagnosed as SUD because the latter, secondary, condition was more 
salient (Connor, Davidson, Sutherland, & Weisler 1999). On the other hand, dependence on 
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sedative anti-anxiety drugs, which act via GABAA receptors, can result from inappropriate 
use of these drugs as hypnotics. This dependence and resultant problems with withdrawal can 
then generate significant anxiety disorder.  
We will discuss a number of ways in which comorbidity can result from vicious 
cycles. The capacity for two-way traffic between SUD and anxiety disorder that we described 
in the previous paragraph provides one explanation of how positive feedback between self-
medication and withdrawal can sustain comorbidity of SUD (usually seen as an externalising 
disorder) and anxiety (as an internalising disorder). (It could be argued that SUD should not 
be characterised as an externalising disorder in such cases as internalising anxiety is the 
primary mechanism.) Positive feedback can also occur within the internalising disorders, with 
panic and anxiety feeding off one another. Much of this can be conditioned by the 
environment and, more generally, life events that people experience and construct; these can 
impact the settings of biological systems (Kendler, Thornton, & Gardner, 2000). Disorders, 
such as anxiety and depression, can also increase the incidence of disorder-enhancing life 
events (Harkness, Monroe, Simons, & Thase, 1999). In contrast to these external mediators of 
comorbidity, the paradoxical association of ADHD with anxiety disorder may result from a 
feedback reaction of one part of the brain to disorder in another. We explore these various 
issues of psychiatric comorbidity further below; but have omitted discussion of anxiety 
symptoms linked to more obviously neurological conditions such as epilepsy (Adamec & 
Young, 2000). 
Pharmacological dissection of the ‘neurotic’ disorders 
We have argued, so far, both for a degree of commonality among the neurotic disorders and 
for a need to distinguish a wide range of neurally differentiated syndromes. Before 
proceeding to the detailed neural model that we will use to support the remainder of our 
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discussion, we will cover the basic pharmacology from which the key elements of the neural 
model are derived. This pharmacology provides reason both to distinguish among syndromes 
and to see them as sharing some aspects of their control.  
The ideal drug would be a ‘magic bullet’, targeting specific symptoms or a specific 
syndrome; but virtually all are less than specific in their effects. However, as academic 
researchers rather than clinicians, we can gain neurally specific information by asking what 
effects are not produced by a set of drugs (Table 1). Consider buspirone, a serotonergic anti-
anxiety drug that targets ‘5HT1A’ receptors. It improves anxiety (and depression), but not 
panic, and is not sedative or addictive. These differential effects show that the neural systems 
controlling fear (as exemplified by panic) and anxiety are somewhat independent. Buspirone 
also shows that an effective anti-anxiety drug need not be sedative, muscle relaxant, or 
addictive. We can compare buspirone with benzodiazepines and note that, at doses that treat 
anxiety, benzodiazepines do not generally affect panic, obsession or, importantly and unlike 
buspirone, depression. Taking buspirone and benzodiazepines together, then, we have reason 
to see anxiety systems (affected by both buspirone and benzodiazepines) as being distinct 
from those (unaffected by at least one of buspirone or benzodiazepines) controlling panic, 
obsession, depression, SUD and a wide range of side effects. As we will discuss later, we can 
also use experimental comparison of the effects of these classes of drug to validate potential 
biomarkers of anxiety disorder. 
  
----- Table 1 about here ----- 
 
In contrast to buspirone and benzodiazepines, there are (Table 1) anti-panic drugs that 
show that fear systems are drug sensitive and that the lack of action on panic of some anti-
anxiety drugs is not simply because panic is insensitive to drugs. Importantly, there are drugs 
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(such as clomipramine) that have not only anti-panic, but also anti-depressant and anti-
obsessional actions, as well as treating generalised anxiety disorder. These act on monoamine 
systems, and have very delayed (weeks or months) development of their therapeutic effects. 
This suggests that they may be acting, directly or indirectly, via a system that controls a 
‘neurotic disorder’ risk factor.  
In order to understand the full range of these neurally distinct disorders, we require a 
model that accounts for the extremely varied symptom presentation in the clinic and the 
significant variation in the capacity of drugs to treat specific types of disorder. But we must 
also account for the extensive comorbidity among anxiety disorders seen in the clinic, the 
wide effectiveness of some of the classes of drug, and the shared neurotic predisposition to 
these disorders. It is to such a model that we now turn. 
A two-dimensional neuropsychology of fear and anxiety  
Our picture of fear, anxiety and their syndromes and symptoms has at its core the 
Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) postulated by Jeffrey Gray (Gray, 1975, 1976). Gray’s 
BIS was defined by sensitivity to anxiolytic drugs (Gray, 1977) and its psychological nature 
is still being progressively determined. The BIS is distinct from, and interacts with, a 
Behavioural Approach System (BAS) controlling pure approach and a Fight, Flight, Freeze 
System (FFFS) controlling active avoidance (Gray, 1982; Gray & McNaughton, 2000). In the 
later versions of the model (Gray & McNaughton, 2000; McNaughton & Corr, 2004, 2008; 
Corr & McNaughton, 2012), fear and anxiety are absolutely distinct, functionally, 
chemically, structurally, and genetically. We see fear (FFFS) and anxiety (BIS) as differing in 
terms of a categorical dimension of ‘defensive direction’. That is, fear is a set of often 
concurrent reactions (e.g., autonomic activation, escape, avoidance) that have evolved to 
allow us to move away from danger and are sensitive to anti-panic drugs, but not anti-anxiety 
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drugs. In contrast, anxiety is a set of reactions (e.g., autonomic activation, risk assessment) 
that have evolved to allow us to move towards, or passively avoid, danger and are sensitive to 
anti-anxiety drugs (and also anti-panic drugs). 
The ethoexperimental work of Robert and Caroline Blanchard (Blanchard & 
Blanchard, 1990a, b) not only provides the basis for a functional distinction between fear and 
anxiety but also shows that the specific fearful or anxious behaviour generated depends on 
‘defensive distance’: this is a cognitive construct consisting in perceived immediacy of threat. 
For any individual on any particular occasion faced with a threat, it is directly related to 
physical distance from the threat in space or time. But for more, or less, threat-sensitive 
individuals a particular physical distance represents a lesser or greater, defensive distance, 
respectively (see Corr & Perkins, 2006).  
Importantly, but not obvious from any single observation of their action, anti-
anxiety drugs alter defensive distance rather than just reducing a specific behaviour: In a 
highly anxious individual, showing little movement towards a threat, an anti-anxiety drug 
will reduce defensive quiescence and allow risk assessment to start; but, a less anxious 
individual (at the same physical or temporal distance) will already be undertaking risk 
assessment and the drug will reduce risk assessment, allowing pre-threat, e.g. appetitive, 
behaviour to appear (Blanchard, Blanchard, Tom, & Rodgers, 1990). 
 
----- Figure 1 about here --- 
 
Figure 1 shows the mapping of this two-dimensional (defensive direction x defensive 
distance) functional picture to a corresponding neural and clinical one. A stream of structures 
is shown (top to bottom), one controlling fear (panic, escape and active avoidance), on the 
left of the figure, the other controlling anxiety (passive avoidance, risk assessment, approach 
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to threat), shown on the right hand side. As can be seen at the bottom of Figure 1, structures 
at the lowest neural level control quick and dirty responses (LeDoux, 1994) to immediate 
threats, and those shown at the top of Figure 1 control relatively slower, sophisticated 
responses to more distant threats. The BAS is not shown in the figure as our current focus is 
on defensive disorders. However, it has a similar hierarchical structure that can be linked 
functionally to ‘appetitive distance’ and that has neural levels matching those shown in 
Figure 1 (orbital frontal cortex, antero-dorsal cingulate cortex, central amygdala, lateral 
hypothalamus, but probably not representation in the PAG; see Figure 7, page 32, of 
McNaughton, DeYoung and Corr, in press).  
An important feature of the control of these systems is the reciprocal links between 
modules both within and between systems (Figure 1). Each structure could operate alone, but 
in practice they tend to be co-activated and often interact (LeDoux, 1996). Any specific threat 
will activate multiple modules concurrently. These in turn, via one set of connections, will 
activate other adjacent modules. Higher level modules will often inhibit the outputs (but not 
the activations) of lower level modules. Thus, a high level of activation in an area like the 
amygdala that can generate a learned avoidance response will inhibit competing directed 
escape or undirected panic controlled by the hypothalamus and periaqueductal grey (PAG), 
respectively, while leaving autonomic activation, for example, intact. As noted previously, it 
is the combination of activation of the FFFS and the approach system that activates the BIS. 
Activation of the BIS, in turn, increases activation of the FFFS but not the approach system 
and so increases risk aversion, negative cognitive bias, and arousal. At the same time, the BIS 
blocks output from the PAG so that inappropriate panic/escape does not interfere with 
cautious approach or passive avoidance. (The inhibition of PAG output by BIS activation 
accounts for the otherwise surprising phenomenon of relaxation-induced panic attacks.) 
However, higher order mechanisms can also release panic. The periaqueductal grey (PAG) 
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receives direct, topographically organised, input from prefrontal cortex (Shipley, Ennis, 
Rizvi, & Behbehani, 1991), which allows complex threat appraisal mechanisms (including 
traits such as catastrophizing) to produce a panic response if a complex threat is assessed as 
being close/immediate. 
To conceptualise the relationship between normal behaviour, symptoms and 
syndromes for these structures, let us, consider the PAG as the simplest case. It is thought to 
control all instances of panic both in humans and rodents, and consistent with this claim, in 
terms of symptoms, panic is much the same whatever the cause (Barlow, 2002). An extreme 
threat in a normal person will produce normal (potentially adaptive) panic – and ‘panic 
attacks’ can be mild (Marks, 1988). A weak threat in a pathologically fearful or anxious 
person will produce an abnormally high input to the PAG and so panic appropriate to the 
pathological fear or anxiety experienced (Goisman et al. 1995). Spontaneous activity in PAG 
(Dantendorfer et al. 1995) could generate spontaneous panic – a neurological syndrome of 
‘pure panic disorder’. Pure panic disorder could also arise from excessive reaction to any one 
of a range of input stimuli: Hypersensitivity to blood carbon dioxide, producing a 
‘suffocation false alarm’ (Klein, 1995); an exaggerated autonomic response (Gurguis, et al. 
1999) to stimulant drugs; poor autonomic control (Middleton, Ashby, & Robbins, 1994); or 
altered central responses to, or levels of, endogenous benzodiazepines (Randall et al. 1995), 
orexins (Johnson et al, 2010), CCK, or monoamines (Sandford, Argyropoulos, & Nutt, 2000). 
We will discuss how such a syndrome of pure neurological panic disorder relates to current 
“Panic Disorder” diagnoses in the following sections. 
A similar case can be made for obsessions and obsessive compulsive disorder 
(OCD), which we noted earlier is treated by our theory as a fear disorder not an anxiety 
disorder. As we have argued in more detail previously (Gray & McNaughton, 2000, pp 288-
289, 324-326), “the repetitive checking of a toddler by a parent can seem obsessive” (p. 289) 
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but is actually normal and functional and would be the result of the normal activation of the 
anterior cingulate (or prefrontal) cortex (Rapoport, 1989). Similarly, “pathologically 
maintained anxiety (most likely generalised anxiety) could provide an unusually high level of 
input to the cingulate-basal ganglia circuitry … [which] could then trigger any latent 
obsessions or compulsions” (p. 326) producing a symptomatic form of OCD. In the 
syndromal case, “obsession and compulsions can arise from over-activity in the cingulate-
basal ganglia circuitry. Often this will give rise to avoidance behaviour (or successful 
checking), will not produce major increased in anxiety, and will not lead to the seeking of 
clinical help. … Where the frequency of fully fledged avoidance is very high, … or the 
avoidance response is in some other way blocked, then there will be conflict … with 
consequent anxiety … [particularly] in those with a neurotic introvert personality” (p326).  
Simple panic, simple phobia, simple obsession, etc., would arise from pathology of 
specific modules (Figure 1) of the defensive systems. But the theory allows for more 
widespread influences. For example, structures on the right hand side of Figure 1 are 
coordinated by a ‘theta rhythm’ that is specifically altered by all anti-anxiety drugs with no 
positive or negative exceptions to date (McNaughton, Kocsis, & Hajós, 2007). This means 
that the entire BIS can be modulated by any endogenous anxiolytic compound and that 
dysfunction of this modulation would generate a disorder that would likely be diagnosed as 
generalised anxiety.  
The theory also allows us to relate morbidity and comorbidity to the idea of ‘neurotic 
disorders’ that we considered above. The monoamines serotonin (5HT) and noradrenaline 
(NA) are a likely substrate for the general factor of neuroticism (Takano, Arakawa, Hayashi, 
Takahashi, Ito, & Suhara, 2007); and, as shown in Figure 1, 5HT /NA diffusely innervate 
most modules of the defence systems. As we noted earlier (Table 1), tricyclic drugs, 
clomipramine, monoamine oxidase inhibitors and specific serotonin reuptake inhibitors all 
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affect both anxiety and fear. However, they are also anti-depressant, and so 5HT/NA systems 
take us beyond the two dimensional defense system to ‘neurotic’ disorders more generally.  
Our take-home message is that individual syndromes may well depend on specific 
structures (or receptors or uptake systems specific to those structures), but more general 
modulatory (and likely predisposing) influences could result in the coordinated activity of 
(comorbid) groups of structures. 
This model predicts a number of observations: A wide range of potential syndromes 
(each resulting when a specific module becomes hyper- or hypo-reactive); extensive 
symptom overlap because of the interaction between modules (resulting in apparent 
comorbidity in relation to current diagnostic systems); and risk factors that modulate multiple 
modules, and even systems, simultaneously precipitating comorbidity.  
We are focussing at a relatively low level of control, but we may well expect that, 
with negative reinforcement generating conditioning and cognitive elaboration, what is 
presented to the psychiatric diagnostician is far removed from the primary activation of the 
neural modules, discussed above. It is for this reason, we believe, that it is difficult to predict 
the efficacy of anti-panic, anti-fear, anti-depression and anti-anxiety drugs at the level of the 
individual patient, many of whom are prescribed a variety of medications until one seems to 
work. In order to determine primary causes, it is at the relatively low level of modules that 
we will likely want to start the scientific search and ultimately develop biomarkers (see 
below). 
Our model also predicts that what will appear on the surface to be a single class of 
comorbidity can arise from two primary alternatives. The first alternative is that (primary) 
hyper-reactivity of one module within one of the systems controlling defense can result in 
excessive symptoms produced by (secondary) hyperactivity of another part that is otherwise 
normal. This is not co-morbidity in the classic medical sense (the co-existence of two distinct 
McNaughton & Corr – page 16 
syndromes) but, with current psychiatric diagnosis based on symptom clusters, it will 
currently fulfil the criteria for more than one disorder. The second alternative is that multiple 
modules may be (primarily) hyper-reactive. This can easily occur if two hyper-reactivities 
share a common risk factor or if one initial hyper-reactivity tends to result in the development 
of another. We believe that, often in clinical practice, the symptomatic and syndromal 
alternatives are intertwined; and that in many cases the same superficial symptomatology can 
arise from a range of different, single or multiple, primary (syndromal) causes. For example, 
while agoraphobia is often (Langs et al, 2000) preceded by, and appears to result from, panic 
attacks (and so be secondary); there is evidence (Friend & Andrews, 1990; Goisman et al 
1994) that it can arise in their absence (and so be primary). Once established, the increased 
arousal associated with it could generate panic attacks (which would now be secondary, see 
also below). In the absence of some form of neuropsychological diagnostic tool (see below), 
it is difficult to differentiate between these possibilities. 
Symptomatic fear/anxiety co-morbidities 
The simplest form of co-morbidity anticipated by our perspective is more apparent than real. 
It involves cases where a genuine underlying hyper-reactivity of some part of a system results 
both directly in symptoms related to its own activity and indirectly in symptoms related to the 
consequent activity in other structures. This consequent activity can result from both neural 
connections with other parts of the same system and, more importantly for the appearance of 
comorbidity, from processes such as conditioning that can affect parts of other systems. We 
will use panic as our primary exemplar of these various effects.  
First let us consider symptomatic development that proceeds from primary 
morbidity in the FFFS to generation of additional BIS-related symptoms. Pure 
physiological/neurological panic without additional complications presents rarely in the 
McNaughton & Corr – page 17 
psychiatric clinic (Shear & Maser, 1994), but is more readily measured in the general 
population (Joyce & Oakley-Browne, 1990) and presents in the cardiology clinic (Holt, 1990; 
Carter, Maddock, Zoglio, Lutrin, Jella, & Amsterdam, 1994). Despite the existence of these 
cases of unprovoked, uncomplicated, ‘pure panic’ attacks, current psychiatric criteria for 
diagnosis of ‘Panic Disorder’ require secondary avoidance or anxiety accompanying the 
panic. However, the occurrence of panic itself ceases to be a problem once avoidance and 
anxiety are treated (Franklin, 1990). We would argue, therefore, that panic disorder proper is 
not, by itself, a major problem; but in, e.g., a person with a neurotic personality it can 
engender inconvenient reactions, including increased autonomic responses that increase the 
incidence of panic, and then present as the current psychiatric ‘panic disorder’ entity.  
 
----- Figure 2 about here --- 
 
 The presentation of panic as a syndrome with symptomatic comorbid anxiety is 
shown in Figure 2. Pathological activity (Dantendorfer et al. 1995), or re-activity (see 
previous section), of the periaqueductal gray produces a panic attack. This will produce 
consequent neural activation of other structures in the FFFS generating, for example, 
increased arousal via the amygdala. A panic attack that is restricted in this way should, from 
our point of view, be labelled ‘panic disorder’; but, unless there are additional developments, 
it will most likely be reported clinically as ‘irritable heart syndrome’ (Holt, 1990). If the 
patient accepts that the symptoms are in fact completely benign then the consequent arousal 
will not increase and may even decrease. However, particularly if the patient has a neurotic 
disposition, association of the initial aversive panic attacks with, for example, mildly 
threatening social situations can result in conditioned anxiety (via the BIS, right hand side of 
Figure 2) and so increased arousal. Increased adrenaline can then precipitate more frequent 
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panic attacks (Sandford et al., 2000), creating a vicious cycle that may result in presentation 
as what is currently diagnosed as panic disorder (if only high arousal and frequent panic 
attacks are present), or agoraphobia with panic (if conditioning results in avoidance of the 
situations that have come to elicit the panic attacks). Treatment of this avoidance, and of the 
negative interpretation of the panic attacks, can eliminate this vicious cycle, and result in a 
return to normal functioning – but with a low level of residual panic attacks remaining 
(Franklin, 1990) since the primary neurological cause remains. 
 
 
----- Figure 3 about here --- 
 
 Such symptomatic developments can also proceed in the other direction, from primary 
morbidity in the BIS to generation of additional FFFS-related symptoms. If elements of the 
BIS are hyper-reactive (right hand side of Figure 3), this will generate a primary pathology 
such as Generalised Anxiety Disorder with, importantly, increased general levels of arousal. 
(Note that there may be a form of agoraphobia that, initially at least, presents without panic 
attacks. This, Social Anxiety Disorder, and dysfunctions of other parts of the BIS, could all 
follow this same symptomatic panic generation scenario.) As we noted in the previous 
paragraph, increased adrenaline will often precipitate panic attacks particularly in those with 
a system that is highly sensitive to its normal inputs (which need not be the case for the 
spontaneous panic attacks of our previous scenario). These adrenaline-induced panic attacks, 
which are in principle normal given the level of (pathological) anxiety being experienced, can 
then result in conditioned increases in the original anxiety, its accompanying arousal, and so 
further panic attacks. 
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Syndromal fear/anxiety co-morbidities 
It is clear from the extensive overlap in the elements of the two scenarios we have 
described, that symptomatic comorbidity would be expected to be common and for the 
primary cause of symptoms of anxiety+panic to be difficult to determine. Coincidence will 
not always be the case – with both simple panic attacks and pure GAD/agoraphobia/social 
anxiety occurring, particularly in those who lack a neurotic personality type or a tendency to 
arousal-elicited panic, respectively. But a combination of symptoms is likely to be common. 
A further expectation is that such symptomatic overlap can lead to a true syndromal 
overlap. Anxiety accompanied by panic is likely to be chronic; anxiety results in the release 
of stress hormones; and chronic stress is likely to result in a progressive development of 
sensitivity (‘kindling’) of the systems involved (Adamec & Shallow, 1993; Adamec, 1997; 
Adamec, Holmes, & Blundell, 2008; Schmidt, Abraham, Maroun, Stork, & Richter-Levin, 
2013). Thus primary dysfunction of one node (with secondary increases in symptoms 
mediated by another node) can evolve into primary dysfunction of both nodes and so true 
syndromal comorbidity. 
For related reasons, we would anticipate a considerable level of comorbidity of initial 
syndromes. Where disorder is generated by chronic stress, this can not only precipitate any 
one of the neurotic disorders but is likely to precipitate more than one at a time. Similarly, if 
the source of disorder is a genetic predisposition to anxiety (i.e., BIS activation) in general 
then more than one node of the system (and so more than one form of anxiety disorder) is 
likely to be involved simultaneously. Likewise, if there is a genetic problem with monoamine 
systems (potentially expressed as neuroticism or a related trait) then both the FFFS and BIS 
could contribute multiple disordered nodes. 
 
----- Figure 4 about here --- 
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Whichever of these various routes is involved, our theory accepts that massive 
apparent comorbidities of its set of proposed symptom clusters will occur with potentially a 
range of concurrent underlying syndromes. This promiscuity creates the current complex 
clinical picture and emphasises the difficulty of separating symptom parallels from true 
syndromal comorbidities. However, while multiple positive feedback loops (Figure 4) 
complicate the diagnostic picture, they are also likely to provide some degree of flexibility of 
treatment. For example, as we have noted already, treating the neurologically normal anxiety 
that is consequent on abnormal panic will reduce arousal, eliminate avoidance, and reduce, 
even when it does not eliminate, panic attacks. 
Syndromal comorbidities beyond fear/anxiety 
We have already touched on the issue of syndromal comorbidities that may be 
consequent on, or etiologically mixed with, symptomatic comorbidities. The syndromes have 
been envisaged as directly involving the FFFS, BIS or both; as a result, the true comorbidities 
can appear continuous, with primary syndrome plus secondary symptoms shading into a pair 
of primary syndromes.  
In the following sections, we discuss comorbidities that go beyond the FFFS and BIS 
systems and involve appetitive systems, one way or another. In some cases they share with 
FFFS/BIS syndromes chronic stress as a source of syndrome development. The three primary 
classes we will consider are an internalising disorder (i.e., depression) and two externalising 
disorders (i.e., SUD and ADHD). All three have a high probability of being comorbid with 
anxiety but for quite different causal reasons. We argue that a neuroscientific perspective of 
the type outlined above will help to shed new light on these more broad ranging 
comorbidities. 
McNaughton & Corr – page 21 
Anxiety and Depression 
Anxiety and depression are likely to co-occur even in the absence of morbidity. There is 
reason (McNaughton, 1989, p 148-149), for example in the specific case of separation 
distress, to see an initial active anxiety response (leading to re-uniting with the parent) as 
being adaptive in the short term and its conversion to a risk- and resource-reducing depressed 
state as being equally adaptive in the long term (allowing survival until the parent’s eventual 
return). Under more general conditions of conflict, depression may also become adaptive as a 
means of “communicating a need for help, signalling yielding in a hierarchy conflict, 
fostering disengagement from commitments to unreachable goals, and regulating patterns of 
investment … [in] situations in which effort to pursue a major goal will likely result in 
danger, loss, bodily damage, or wasted effort” (Nesse, 2000). Thus anxious, depressive and 
stress responses may have co-evolved (Nesse, 1999) to solve the problems presented by both 
immediate (anxiety), and longer term (depression), goal conflict. On this view, it is 
unsurprising that the hippocampus is not only the key node of the BIS but also the main 
structure in the brain through which stress hormone levels are regulated (see Sapolsky, 2004; 
Sapolsky, Krey, & McEwen, 1984). Importantly, while acute anxiety-related responses 
involve increased activity in the FFFS but do not change the BAS, and so potentially solve 
the problem of goal conflict by withdrawal, we would argue (following Nesse) that the more 
chronic depression-related responses can suppress BAS activity (reducing the tendency to 
approach what are now seen as unreachable goals) not only via a reduction of output but via 
processes such as anhedonia. The argument, so far, is most clear if we see active attempts to 
solve a problem as leading to “danger, loss, bodily damage”. However, it has been suggested 
that while “some categories of defences are more proximal and symptom-focused, and result 
directly from … anxious states [but] other kinds of defences operate more distally and mute 
anxiety by activating approach-oriented states … [that] vary in the extent to which they … 
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resolve the original discrepancy or are merely palliative” (Jonas et al, 2014).  In this case, 
Nesses’s final alternative “wasted effort” makes it functional to suppress the BAS. Given 
these reasons for linking chronic functional anxiety with functional depression; it seems 
likely that chronic functional or dysfunctional anxiety would lead to depression with primary 
dysfunctional anxiety producing secondary dysfunctional depression; and chronic anxiety of 
both types resulting in pathological depression in stress-sensitive individuals. 
The most obvious additional reason for a high comorbidity between anxiety and 
depression is that they share a common pre-disposing risk factor, neurotic personality. Even 
if their precipitating causes and neural substrates were independent, shared risk would lead us 
to expect co-occurrence. Potentially linked to this, serotonin (5HT) signalling is altered in 
anxiety and depression and may contribute to comorbidity (Deakin, 1998). Specific serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are now a first-line therapy in the treatment of anxiety-depression 
comorbidity (Kaufman & Charney 2000). 5HT1A receptor ligands are effective in both 
disorders; but normalisation of 5HT produces distinct antidepressant and anxiolytic actions 
(Deakin, 1993). If quite separate 5HT systems mediate deficits in anxiety and depression, 
selectively, then neither would control specific comorbidity, which could nonetheless depend 
on more general variation in the global control of 5HT. 
Anxiety and depression also appear to share precipitating causes. The triple 
comorbidity of PTSD+anxiety+depression occurs in about half of war veterans, this being 
about 3 times the rate in this population of PTSD alone or of PTSD comorbid with only one 
of anxiety/depression (Ginzburg, Ein-dor, & Solomon, 2010). Thus, even more so than with 
the other neurotic disorders, we can see anxiety and depression as linked and, therefore, often 
comorbid. 
Anxiety, as we have noted already, is a stressor – it releases corticosterone. Stress 
system dysregulation appears to precipitate affective disorders (Kessler, 1997), being 
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moderate in primary anxiety disorder and strong in primary and comorbid major depressive 
disorder (Kara, Yazici, Güleç, & Ünsal, 2000). Clinical depression can be viewed as a form 
of dysfunctional stress response (Pariante & Miller, 2001; Pariante, 2003); and so it is 
unsurprising that clinical depression can be consequent on chronic anxiety (which will itself 
often be pathological), resulting in the two being comorbid.  
Finally, we should note that there may be a distinct condition that presents 
symptomatically as depression co-morbid with anxiety but where both sets of symptoms are 
generated by a common underlying dysfunction that is more chronic and severe than those 
giving rise to anxiety or depression, separately, and which is accompanied by a higher suicide 
risk (Roy-Byrne, Stang, Wittchen, Ustun, Walters, & Kessler, 2000). Consistent with this, 
war veterans who “would endorse a lifetime triple comorbidity [of 
PTSD+anxiety+depression] are likely to have more impaired functioning (Ginzburg, Ein-dor, 
& Solomon, 2010, p 249). 
Anxiety and SUD 
Conversely to anxiety producing comorbid depression, SUD can produce comorbid anxiety. 
(For a more detailed version of the following discussion see McNaughton, 2008.) 
Recreational use of alcohol or the regular use of barbiturates or benzodiazepines as hypnotics 
results in tolerance, dependence, and addiction. Tolerance, in particular, then leads to 
rebound anxiety upon withdrawal of the drugs. (Each of these classes of drug has its own 
binding site on the GABAA receptor system; through which all produce anti-anxiety actions 
as well as euphoria and muscle relaxation). However, this anti-anxiety action, and the 
stressful nature of anxiety, gives it a capacity to generate SUD. SUD can often start with, and 
be substantially maintained by, self-medication particularly with alcohol. Once alcohol intake 
has started, the story is essentially the same as with recreational use leading to SUD. Here 
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again we have the potential for a vicious cycle (as when anxiety and panic feed off each 
other) with anxiety and SUD reinforcing each other (for detailed reviews see Stewart & 
Conrod, 2008). It should be emphasised that we are describing only one aspect of SUD, here, 
and that the causes of addiction go much deeper than a response to anxiety.  
 
----- Figure 5 about here ---  
 
An important point to note in relation to the self-medication story we have just 
presented is that SUD and the control of anxiety are linked through a complex web of 
endogenous interacting compounds (Figure 5). Serotonergic anti-anxiety drugs (such as 
buspirone or fluoxetine) impact on the neural structures that control anxiety (e.g. 
hippocampus and amygdala) in much the same way as GABAA drugs, and without showing 
tolerance. Both classes of drug also (Figure 5) have their anti-anxiety action reduced (Meijer 
& de Kloet, 1994; Meijer, Van Oosten, & de Kloet, 1997) by corticosterone/cortisol (CORT). 
However, 5HT1A drugs differ from GABAA drugs in two important respects. The first (Figure 
5) is that serotonergic drugs release CORT on initial use while GABAA drugs inhibit it 
(Broadbear, Winger, & Woods, 2005) (with both classes of drug showing tolerance of their 
effects on CORT release). This partially explains the initial dysphoric effects of the 
serotonergics and euphoric effects of the GABAA drugs. The second is that GABAA drugs, 
but not serotonergics, activate opiate systems (Kostowski & Biénkowski, 1999; Richardson, 
Reynolds, Cooper, & Berridge, 2005) that in turn activate dopamine systems producing 
rewarding and euphoriant actions that contribute to their abuse potential. We can argue, then, 
that the strong links between anxiety disorder and SUD relate to endogenous compounds that 
regulate not only anxiety but also reward systems. 
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Anxiety and ADHD 
The final case that we will consider also likely involves complex interactions but between 
neural rather than chemical systems. The starting point is the observed high level of 
comorbidity of anxiety with ADHD (Costello, Mustillo, Erkanli, Keeler, & Angold, 2003), 
30% can have comorbid anxiety disorders (Pliszka, 1998; Spencer, Biderman, & Wilens, 
1999). This is, at first blush, surprising both at a superficial level and at the deeper theoretical 
level. At the superficial level, ADHD is thought to involve a fundamental problem of 
insufficient behavioural inhibition (Barkley, 1997) akin to the effect of anti-anxiety drugs. At 
the theoretical level, ADHD has been attributed to a fundamental hypofunction of the BIS 
(Quay, 1997), a system that we have argued generates anxiety. We will argue that ADHD is 
the result of dysfunction of both more (dopamine, white matter) and less (prefrontal but not 
subcortical) than the BIS as a whole. Since only prefrontal modules of the BIS are involved, 
this allows for comorbidity of externalizing and internalizing disorders, resulting from 
opposite frontal (hypoactive) and subcortical (hyperactive) BIS dysfunctions, respectively.  
As is well known, ADHD involves two main types of symptom cluster: Inattentive 
(ADHD-IA; distractibility and difficulty focusing on tasks for a sustained period) and 
hyperactive/impulsive (ADHD-HI; fidgeting, excessive talking, and restlessness). These 
often occur together as a combined type (ADHD-CT; downgraded to combined ‘presentation’ 
in DSM-5). The clearest neural abnormalities (see also Table 2) are of the frontal lobe and 
white matter connections between the frontal lobe and subcortical regions, including the basal 
ganglia (Castellanos et al., 2002; Sowell, Toga, & Asarnow, 2000). “The most replicated 
alterations [in ADHD] . . . include significantly smaller volumes in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, caudate, pallidum, corpus callosum, and cerebellum” (Seidman, Valera, & Makris, 
2005, p. 1263). As we have discussed in more detail elsewhere (Corr & McNaughton, 2016), 
several externalising disorders share these prefrontal developmental distortions and we will 
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discuss their differences, particularly in subcortical abnormalities, in the next section. There 
is dysfunction of noradrenergic systems (e.g., Plizska, 1988); and reduced dopamine in both 
mesocortical input to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and mesolimbic input to the nucleus 
accumbens may account for some cognitive impairments in ADHD (Sonuga-Barke, 2005) but 
with clear individual differences (Volkow, Wang, Newcorn, Fowler, et al., 2007a, p. 1182; 
see also Volkow, Wang, Newcorn, Telang, et al., 2007b). 
Dysfunctional BIS activity has been implicated in ADHD (Beauchaine et al., 2001; 
Quay, 1997). Low BIS activity would result in reduced behavioural inhibition (i.e., a reduced 
capacity to inhibit prepotent goals and to resolve conflict by increased risk aversion), reduced 
attention (including both environmental and memory scanning), and reduced arousal. This 
profile of symptoms features particularly in ADHD-IA. But the neural abnormalities we have 
just described involve only frontal and not subcortical aspects of the BIS (see Sauder, 
Beauchaine, Gatzke-Kopp, Shannon, & Aylward, 2012; Stevenson & McNaughton, 2013). 
Conversely, there are behavioural changes that go beyond the BIS. Of particular note, is 
stopping in the stop signal task (SST). Impaired stopping in ADHD has been taken as 
evidence of BIS involvement; but SST stopping appears to depend on action rather than goal 
circuits (Neo, Thurlow, & McNaughton, 2011) and, critically, is insensitive to the anxiolytic 
drugs that define the BIS (McNaughton, Swart, Neo, Bates, & Glue, 2013). Therefore, in 
relation to both positive and negative features, it is difficult to see ADHD-IA simply as the 
low end of a BIS dimension. It is best seen as a dysfunction of prefrontal but not subcortical 
aspects of the BIS coupled with dysfunction of other prefrontal systems with the motivational 
component of the resultant phenotype being primarily BIS−. 
Moving on to ADHD-CT, one idea is that it is associated with not only poor cognitive 
control (BIS−) but also with high positive and negative emotionality (BAS+, FFFS+; 
respectively). This combination of BAS+ and FFFS+ would result in the generation of a 
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greater tendency to make responses in the absence of conflict as well as in much higher levels 
of motivation under conditions of conflict (when the BAS and FFFS are equally activated). If 
so, all types of ADHD would show some dysfunction of the BIS. However, we cannot, as yet, 
rule out the possibility that in ADHD-CT the BIS is dysfunctional in relative rather than 
absolute terms – being activated by conflict but with insufficient power to inhibit the outputs 
of BAS hyperactivity. 
We can see two reasons for the known ADHD neurology giving rise both to inhibitory 
problems and anxiety. The prefrontal components of the BIS normally process conflicts 
between goals that are at greater defensive distances than the subcortical components. 
Importantly, when they are activated they will tend to inhibit output from the subcortical 
components. So, if the prefrontal BIS is relatively unreactive, behavioural inhibition will be 
lost for distant but not close goals (allowing impulsivity free reign), and this will tend to 
result in situations where threats that would previously have been avoided at a distance occur 
at close range; and so generate anxiety via the subcortical components of the BIS. A second 
alternative, which is not mutually exclusive with the first, is that threats will be more likely to 
produce outputs via areas that normally deal with more immediate reactions and lack the 
inhibition that would normally be provided by slow and sophisticated systems. This will 
result in greater perceived immediacy of a threat than if the reactions were mediated by 
prefrontal components of the BIS.  
A neuropsychology of externalizing disorders 
Our resolution of the paradox of ADHD (an externalizing disorder) being often comorbid 
with internalizing anxiety disorders raises the question of why such comorbidity is not also 
true of other externalizing disorders with similar prefrontal neurology (that is, excluding 
SUD).  As summarized in Table 2, and discussed in more detail by Corr & McNaughton 
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(2016), pathology of the BIS and FFFS combine with important hyperactivity of the 
behavioural approach system (BAS) to generate aspects of ADHD, phenylketonuria (PKU) 
conduct disorder (CD) and psychopathy – and contribute to the comorbidity of these 
disorders. Importantly, while the BIS is often seen to be exclusively related to internalizing 
disorders, we emphasize that it contributes (through under-activity) to externalizing ones. 
Importantly, the detailed neurology of this contribution can account not only for differences 
between the externalizing disorders and their comorbidity with each other but also for their 
pattern of comorbidity with internalizing disorders.  
Dysfunctional behaviour can result from dysfunction of any one of the BAS, FFFS 
and BIS in isolation but will also often result from dysfunction of these and other systems 
acting in combination (see, e.g., Beauchaine, 2001; Beauchaine, Katkin, Strassberg, & Snarr, 
2001). In conditions involving a pure excess of approach behavior, the BAS is likely to be 
functionally dominant. However, the BIS is often important for clinical presentation because 
it is involved in the regulation of goal conflict detection and resolution. BIS dysfunction 
causes failure of inhibition of inappropriate behaviour, which can be as important as 
excessive approach in generating externalizing symptoms. 
The externalizing disorders shown in Table 2 appear to arise from a number of quite 
different proximal developmental causes. However, they ultimately converge on largely 
similar neural substrates (dopamine, white matter, large neutral amino acids) that alter largely 
similar prefrontal and temporal lobe circuits. For example, PKU has a quite distinct (point 
mutation) etiology from ADHD but, subject to the extent of dietary control, has a very similar 
final neural and behavioral phenotype; so that PKU, as a syndrome, can often be seen as 
comorbid with ADHD (Stevenson & McNaughton, 2013).  We have argued that the 
differences between disorders may reflect relatively small differences in the boundaries of the 
systems affected. On this view there is a “topographically variable zone of neural 
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dysfunction” (Corr & McNaughton, 2016) with details of the individual topography of 
different cases accounting for common (neurally overlapping) and unique (non-overlapping) 
presenting features of the externalizing psychopathologies. There appears to be a common set 
of rostral prefrontal structures across the disorders with what appears to be a caudal 
progression of prefrontal and subcortical involvement. In the specific case of the BIS, as we 
progress from ADHD through CD to psychopathy the caudal boundary of dysfunction 
appears to progress from dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to the hippocampus and, then, the 
superior temporal gyrus and the amygdala. That is, ADHD has the least subcortical BIS 
dysfunction (albeit with some evidence of hippocampal disconnection) and psychopathy the 
most. 
This topographical perspective accounts for not only many details of the individual 
syndromes but also for certain aspects of comorbidity.  On this view, it is the combination of 
nominally syndrome-specific forms of damage that produces specific forms of comorbidity 
(e.g., ADHD + psychopathy). For example, some 60% of children with ADHD also have a 
diagnosis of oppositional defiant disorder and/or CD (Beauchaine et al., 2010); and 
approximately 70% of CD children have comorbid diagnosis of ADHD (Beauchaine et al., 
2001). On the face of it, ADHD and CD would seem very different disorders. “With respect 
to externalising disorders in childhood, Quay suggested that ADHD and CD reflect different 
problems in the functioning of the BAS and the BIS. ADHD is characterised by an 
underactive BIS, whereas CD is associated with a BAS that dominates over the BIS: when 
cues for both reward and punishment are present, CD children focus on cues for reward at the 
expense of cues for punishment” (Matthys et al., 1998, p. 644; see also Matthys, 
Vanderschuren, & Schutter, 2013). But their neurologies have clear commonalities and a case 
with neurological abnormality overlapping both syndrome-specific zones is eminently likely. 
There is evidence that comorbid ADHD+CD children are prone to develop severe 
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externalizing disorders in adulthood (Beauchaine, Hinshaw, & Pang, 2010; Beauchaine & 
McNulty, 2013), including psychopathy (Greshman, Lane, & Lambros, 2000). Also, when we 
come to genetic loading, it is useful to think in terms of dosage: “…comorbidity between CD 
and the hyperactive/impulsive subtype of ADHD… represents a particularly virulent 
condition, characterised by a strong genetic loading, increased rates of aggression, and 
elevated risks of future antisocial behaviour . . . and score [high] on measures of 
psychopathy” (Beauchaine et al., 2001, p. 610; see also Finger et al., 2011, p. 152; Gresham, 
Lane, & Lambros, 2000). Our topographical view, coupled with the extent of comorbidities, 
would not be incompatible with a ‘spectrum’ view of ADHD-CD-psychopathy – with the 
specific presentation of any particular individual case reflecting their particular map of 
affected fronto-temporal areas and tracts. 
Neuropsychology, personality, and biomarkers 
We have presented a strongly neuropsychological view of both internalizing and 
externalizing disorders. We did discuss psychological factors, particularly in relation to 
symptomatic comorbidity, but nonetheless we could be taken to have implied that primary 
psychiatric disorder results from explicit neural pathology. Here, we redress the balance 
noting that: (a) a normally distributed long-term neurobiological sensitivity can be 
psychiatrically problematic at either extreme without requiring any explicit neural pathology 
(hence our exclusion of epilepsy earlier); (b) such sensitivities (and associated sometimes 
fairly gross developmental variation in neural structures) must be the fundamental substrates 
of personality factors, traits or facets; and, (c) a solution to the problem of diagnosing 
primary morbidity and, hence, syndromal comorbidity is to develop biomarkers that assess 
the sensitivity of the relevant neurobiological systems. 
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It has long been argued that establishing links between personality and disorder is 
vital to understanding diathesis, etiology, progression, prognosis and treatment of mental 
illness (e.g., Costa & Widiger, 1994; Harkness & Lilienfeld, 1997; Krueger & Tackett, 2003, 
2006; Tackett, 2006; Watson, Clark, & Harkness, 1994; Widiger & Trull, 1992; Widiger, 
Verheul, & van den Brink, 1999). We have identified a range of neural processes the 
sensitivities of which could underlie long-term consistency of behavioural reactivity (i.e., 
‘personality’). Either extreme of any neurobiological trait can then potentially be a risk factor 
for some set of disorders, the substrate of a specific disorder, or both. 
Most functionally general are the monoamine and pituitary-adrenal systems. We have 
discussed long-term effects of serotonin, noradrenalin and stress hormones on systems 
controlling internalizing disorders; and briefly touched on the long-term, particularly 
developmental, effects of dopamine on systems controlling externalizing disorders. Chronic 
levels of some monoamines or hormones, system-wide, alter the reactivity of many parts of 
each system concurrently, giving rise to clusters of characters that define, for example, the 
‘neurotic individual’. Consistent with this, anxiety disorder, in the typical population, has an 
estimated genetic loading of approximately 30% and this is true even with generalized 
anxiety, which is comorbid with other conditions, including depression (Kendler et al., 
1992a,b,c). Thus, genetic vulnerability is of ‘neurotic disorders’ (including depression, but 
excluding simple phobia) and is not specific for any one ‘anxiety disorder’ (Andrews et al., 
1990).   
At the other end of the specificity spectrum, there are personality predispositions (e.g., 
obsessionality, panic proneness, social anxiousness) that depend on the sensitivity of quite 
specific modules within the FFFS or BIS. While the reactivity of the modules concerned will 
depend, in concert, on monoamine inputs (and so be impacted on by ‘neuroticism’) each can 
have its own unique reactivity: obsessionality depending on, e.g., the specific re-uptake 
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systems in the cingulate cortex that are sensitive to clomipramine but not imipramine 
(Rapoport, 1989); panic proneness being dependent on long term settings of a wide variety of 
systems we have already discussed; and social anxiety dependent on, perhaps, prefrontal 
monoamine oxidase. Each of these sensitivities will have its own epigenetic, genetic, and 
environmental (particularly developmental) contribution.  
At the, intermediate, system level (FFFS/BIS), it is important to remind ourselves that 
anxiolytic drugs alter defensive distance and so change the level of the BIS that is in control 
of behaviour rather than altering any single module and, thus, any single behavior. They act 
like a personality factor of ‘anxiety proneness’ distinct from any ‘fear proneness’ and from 
any more specific proneness to panic or obsession. The anti-anxiety action of the 
benzodiazepines is achieved by adjusting the amplification of any subsequent effect of 
GABA at the GABAA receptor but does not affect the current state of the chloride channel 
(Haefely, 1992). The benzodiazepine site is likely to be the target of circulating ‘anxiety-
specific’ hormone-like compounds (quite distinct from stress hormones and, as noted above, 
likely antagonized by stress hormones). Importantly, different benzodiazepines can increase, 
or decrease, sensitivity to GABA. Endogenous compounds active at the ‘benzodiazepine’ 
receptor may, then, have a hormonal-like action (see Gray & McNaughton, 2000) controlling 
long term reactivity and supporting a personality factor, high levels of which could represent 
generalized anxiety disorder. Unlike changes in the serotonin system, changes in this system 
would not affect morbidity for pure OCD (i.e. presenting as a pure fear disorder 
uncontaminated by anxiety), panic disorder, or depression. It could affect the extent to which 
anxiety resulted from, and so was comorbid with, those conditions – and so impact on current 
DSM/ICD diagnoses. Conversely, longer term decreases in reactivity could provide 
vulnerability to a range of disorders of insufficient anxiety; generating some form of 
externalizing disorder. On this view, both extremely high and extremely low levels of anxiety 
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would be dysfunctional—a proposition consistent with the maintenance of a normal 
distribution of this trait in the general population. 
In contrast to benzodiazepines, serotonergic agents achieve anti-anxiety action by 
binding to the 5-HT1A receptor. The normal ligand for this receptor is serotonin, which is also 
released concurrently onto other 5-HT receptors. An endogenous, 5-HT1A-specific hormone 
is unlikely. Changes in the 5-HT system should affect a broad range of the amazing variety of 
5HT receptors (similar to effects of serotonin-selective reuptake inhibitors such as fluoxetine) 
or monoamines more generally (similar to effects of monoamine oxidase inhibitors) would 
therefore be expected to produce concurrent variation in both the FFFS (trait fear) and the 
BIS (trait anxiety), thus generating factors with broad-ranging effects, such as neuroticism. 
However, selective changes in 5HT1A receptor density or sensitivity could underlie more 
anxiety-specific chronic effects. It should also be noted that, as discussed earlier, stress 
hormones may act fairly generally as antagonists of anti-anxiety hormonal actions. 
Clinical and genetic data are consistent with our suggested endogenous 
benzodiazepine / endogenous monoamine modulation of defense systems. Statistical models 
of reported symptoms extract a higher order internalizing (e.g., depression and generalized 
anxiety disorder) factor encompassing lower order facets of ‘fear’ and ‘anxious-misery,’ 
which share about 50% of their variance (Krueger, 1999). There appear to be distinct risk 
factors for anxiety and mood disorders, on the one hand, and phobias and panic disorders, on 
the other (Krueger & Markon, 2006). These two risk factors are labeled ‘Distress’ and ‘Fear’, 
which seem to parallel BIS and FFFS sensitivities, respectively. Distress and Fear, though 
distinct, are strongly correlated, reflecting a more general internalizing factor that resembles a 
personality factor of Neuroticism (Griffith et al., 2010). Likewise, the general genetic risk for 
internalizing disorders breaks down ‘anxious-misery’ (i.e., depression and generalized 
anxiety disorder) and specific ‘fear’ (i.e., animal and situational phobia) components 
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(Kendler, Prescott, Myers, & Neale, 2003). So, comorbidity, continuity and discontinuity in 
clinical disorders would appear to be reflected in personality traits related to these disorders. 
If psychiatric disorder is fundamentally an extreme of a personality trait this 
immediately raises a problem for diagnosis. Here, the contrast between PKU and ADHD is 
instructive. PKU, qua disorder, can be detected with a simple blood test (although the extent 
to which it generates psychiatric problems varies strongly with dietary control). ADHD, on 
the other hand, cannot be simply defined in terms of a point mutation or other single simple 
biological character. The neurotic disorders represent an even harder problem with common 
predisposing factors and overlapping symptom/syndrome presentations. What are required 
are distinct biomarkers for the syndromal basis for the presenting neurotic symptoms. 
The solution to the biomarker problem, here, is to determine the sensitivity of the 
underlying neuropsychological systems that support both the relevant fundamental 
personality factor and its clinical extreme. As yet, there are no proven biomarkers of this type 
for any psychiatric disorder. However, the strong neuropsychological basis of the theory of 
the BIS has allowed development of a biomarker for BIS reactivity as a whole (McNaughton, 
2014) that we are currently testing for its capacity to be the substrate of a clinical disorder. 
The key aspects of this biomarker are that: (1) it is a rhythmic EEG signal in the same 
frequency band (Shadli et al., 2015) as the rat hippocampal theta rhythm that acts as the most 
reliable current assay of anti-anxiety drug action (McNaughton et al., 2007); (2) it correlates 
with the shared variance of ‘neuroticism’ and ‘trait anxiety’ personality measures (Neo et al., 
2011); and (3) it is sensitive to benzodiazepines, buspirone (McNaughton et al, 2013) and 
pregabalin (Shadli, McIntosh, Glue, & McNaughton, 2015), i.e., all the known classes of 
anti-anxiety drug that lack either anti-panic or antidepressant action. Our prediction is that 
this biomarker will show abnormally high values in some subgroups of, for example, 
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panic+anxiety symptom patients with the remainder of the, superficially similar, patients 
showing abnormally high values on, e.g., some future biomarker of PAG dysfunction.   
 
From DSM to RDoC     
Even the most recent update of psychiatry’s primary diagnostic manual, DSM-5, is seen by, 
e.g., the Director of the National Institutes of Mental Health as unsatisfactory.  
 
Unlike our definitions of ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or AIDS, the DSM 
diagnoses are based on a consensus about clusters of clinical symptoms, not any 
objective laboratory measure. In the rest of medicine, this would be equivalent to 
creating diagnostic systems based on the nature of chest pain or the quality of fever. 
Indeed, symptom-based diagnosis, once common in other areas of medicine, has been 
largely replaced in the past half century as we have understood that symptoms alone 
rarely indicate the best choice of treatment. 
Patients with mental disorders deserve better. NIMH has launched the 
Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project to transform diagnosis by incorporating 
genetics, imaging, cognitive science, and other levels of information to lay the 
foundation for a new classification system. Through a series of workshops over the 
past 18 months, we have tried to define several major categories for a new nosology 
(see below). This approach began with several assumptions: 
 A diagnostic approach based on the biology as well as the symptoms must not 
be constrained by the current DSM categories, 
 Mental disorders are biological disorders involving brain circuits that 
implicate specific domains of cognition, emotion, or behavior, 
 Each level of analysis needs to be understood across a dimension of function, 
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 Mapping the cognitive, circuit, and genetic aspects of mental disorders will 
yield new and better targets for treatment. 
It became immediately clear that we cannot design a system based on biomarkers or 
cognitive performance because we lack the data. 
Insel (2013; see also Insel et al, 2010 for a more detailed description of RDoC) 
 
We would argue that the theoretical approach we have taken in this paper is tightly aligned 
with RDoC and, in that sense, provides an antidote for the generic problems of the approach 
taken in DSM and ICD. We do not claim that converting our preclinical theory to clinical 
practice is simple. However, we argue that the biomarker described in the previous section is 
the result of the kind of translational effort required to provide elements of a system of the 
RDoC type that is focused on ‘fundamental underlying mechanisms of dysfunction [and] the 
development of new treatments targeted to underlying pathophysiological mechanisms’ (Insel 
et al., 2013, p 748).  
 That said, the nature of our biomarker suggests that at least some psychiatric disorder 
as define via RDoC will remain distinct in principle from “ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, 
or AIDS”. These disorders have a distinct categorical biological cause. Our biomarker 
reflects a continuous source of variation within the population that is best thought of as a 
personality trait, where extreme high and low values can each be classified as dysfunction but 
with no clear boundary between the functional and dysfunctional. We do not see this as a 
problem since physical medicine already uses drugs to treat high blood pressure in and of 
itself (with some arguing that reductions below ‘normal’ are therapeutic in terms of risk 
reduction) and a similar approach can be taken to the related continuous variables that will 
emerge in RDoC psychiatry. 
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Conclusions 
We have argued here that the complex, apparently comorbid, symptom patterns of fear and 
anxiety disorders observed in the clinic can be accounted for by a simple two dimensional 
neuropsychology of fear and anxiety. Critically, any module of these defense systems can 
generate normal behavior, react normally but to abnormality in another module and so 
generate symptoms, or react abnormally producing a syndrome. Patients that are superficially 
similar in terms of their symptoms may then have one, or another, or both of any two 
fundamental disorders. We argue that diagnosis must, therefore, proceed via the use of 
biomarkers that detect hyper-reactivity of the various different neural modules and so allow 
detection of true syndromes and true comorbidity. We have provided one example of a 
recently developed biomarker that may achieve this for one anxiety syndrome.  
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Table 1: Relative effectiveness of drugs in treating different aspects of neurotic disorder (Gray & McNaughton, 
2000; McNaughton, 2002; Stein, Vythilingum, & Seedat, 2004; Stevens & Pollack, 2005; Westenberg, 1999; 
Stein, Hollander, Mullen, DeCaria, & Liebowitz, 1992; Rickels & Rynn, 2002). Simple phobia  is included for 
comparison as a fear/anxiety-related disorder that is not linked to neurotic personality. Abuse potential is 
included to emphasise the fact that antianxiety efficacy, per se, is not linked to abuse. Different patterns of 
response in the table can be attributed to the variation in receptor occupancy or interaction by particular drugs in 
different parts of the brain. No drug or drug class produces a specific limited effect (despite the omission of side 
effects from the table) but the variation in relative effectiveness across the different aspects of neurotic disorder 
argues for distinct neural control of each. Table and text from McNaughton (2008). 
Symbols: 0, no effect; – reduction; —, extensive reduction; +, increase; ( ), small or discrepant effects. 
    __ ‘antianxiety’___ ____‘antidepressant’____ 
               BDZ1  BUS  BDZ2  IMI  CMI  MAOI SSRI 
Simple Phobia        0    ?   ? 0   ?   (-) (-) 
Generalized Anxiety  –    –   –  –   –   ? – 
Social Anxiety   – (–) (–) 0 (–) – – 
Unipolar Depression       0   –   – –   –   – – 
Atypical Depression       0    ?   ? (–)   ?   – ? 
Panic Attacks      0   0   – –   —   – – 
Obsessions/Compulsions 0    (–) 0  (–)   —   (–) — 
Abuse potential   + 0 + 0 0 0 0 
 
BDZ1 early benzodiazepines, e.g., chlordiazepoxide (Librium) and diazepam (Valium) administered at typical 
antianxiety doses. Other sedative antianxiety drugs (barbiturates, meprobamate) have similar effects. 
BDZ2 later high potency benzodiazepines, e.g. alprazolam (Xanax). The antipanic effect is achieved at higher 
doses and this has also been reported with equivalent high doses for BDZ1 (Noyes Jr. et al. 1996). 
BUS Buspirone (BuSpar) and related 5HT1A agonists. 
CMI Clomipramine (Anafranil). 
IMI imipramine (Tofranil) and other tricyclic antidepressants, but excluding clomipramine 
MAOI Monoamine Oxidase Inhibitors, e.g. phenelzine (Nardil). 
SSRI Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors, e.g. fluoxetine (Prozac). 
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Table 2. A tentative summary of relations between motivational phenotype and neural source. Note that, with 
the exception of the amygdala and hippocampus, affected subcortical areas have been omitted, as have the 
posterior cingulate and the cerebellum. Subtypes of both ADHD and psychopathy (PSYC) have been assigned 
the same structural values (gray areas) because there is insufficient data to delineate their neural differences. 
Involvement of an area is indicated for major dysfunction (--), dysfunction (−), minor dysfunction or 
disconnection (*), no reported involvement (0), and hyperactivity (+). ADHD-IA, ADHD inattentive subtype; 
ADHD-CT, ADHD combined subtype; PKU, phenylketonuria; PSYC-1, primary psychopathy; PSYC-2, 
secondary psychopathy; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; BAS, behavioral approach system; BIS, behavioral 
inhibition system; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; FFFS, fight-flight-freeze system; MIFG, medial or 
inferior frontal gyrus; OFC, orbital frontal cortex; STG, superior temporal gyrus. Table and legend taken from 
Corr & McNaughton (2016). 
Diagnosis   ADHD-IA ADHD-CT PKU CD PSYC-1 PSYC-2 
Phenotype BAS 0 + as ADHD + 0 + 
  FFFS 0 + as ADHD 0 - 0 
  BIS - - as ADHD * -- -- 
BAS Structures OFC 0 0 0 - - - 
FFFS structures ACC - - - -- -- -- 
  amygdala 0 0 0 - -- -- 
BIS structures DLPFC - - - * - - 
  Temporal - - - - - - 
  STG 0 0 0 - - - 
  hippocampus * * - - - - 
Other structures White matter - - - 0 + + 
  insula 0 0 0 - - - 
  MIFG - - - 0 - - 
  Parietal - - - -- 0 0 
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Figure 1: The 2D defence system (direction x distance), updated from McNaughton and Corr (2004). Brain 
area in capitals, normal function lower case, nominal disorder (closest current diagnosis) in italics. Note the 
reciprocal (excitatory and inhibitory) connections between levels and systems. The stippled oval represents 
areas that show RSA (see text), which is modulated by 5HT1A and BDZ receptor agonists. Dashed lines = 
5HT/NA modulation. 5HT = 5-hydroxytryptamine /serotonin; 5HT1A = 5HT1A receptors; BDZ = benzodiazepine 
receptors; NA = noradrenaline; OCD = obsessive compulsive disorder; PAG = periaqueductal grey; PFC = (pre) 
frontal cortex; RSA = rhythmical slow activity. Figure and legend from McNaughton (2014).  
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Figure 2: Panic as a syndrome with symptomatic comorbid anxiety. Lower levels of the Flight, Fight Freeze 
(FFFS) system (bottom left) produce spontaneous activity (or hyper-reactivity) of the periaqueductal gray 
(PAG) generating pathological panic attacks. Active avoidance and arousal are increased via existing ascending 
neural connections of the FFFS (solid outline filled grey arrows, width indicates degree of activation, simple 
black double headed arrows show available connections). Coincidence of the occurrence of the panic attack with 
distinctive or threatening environmental circumstances can result  – particularly in neurotic introverts – in the 
learning of anticipatory anxiety (dashed outline filled grey arrow), mediated by the hippocampus and amygdala, 
and the normal spread of neural activity through the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS). Thus abnormal panic 
produces fear and anxiety that are normal given the level of perceived threat generated by the panic. Note that 
this implies that a treatment such as cognitive behavioural therapy could modify the anxiety, and considerably 
reduce the incidence and increase the tolerability of panic attacks, while leaving a primary, neurological, 
incidence of panic intact.  Figure modified and updated from McNaughton (2005).  
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Figure 3: Symptomatic comorbid panic with syndromal anxiety disorder. Abbreviations and symbols as in 
Figure 2. Upper levels of the BIS (top right), show abnormal spontaneous activity (or hyper-reactivity) of the 
hippocampus, amygdala, or both, generating pathological generalised anxiety. Other aspects of anxiety are 
increased via existing descending neural connections (solid outline filled grey arrows) of the BIS (and also 
ascending connections, not shown). Increased peripheral arousal, e.g. levels of adrenaline, activates the PAG 
(dashed outline filled grey arrow) and generates panic attacks – particularly in panic prone individuals; and also 
produces a normal spread of neural activity through the FFFS. Thus abnormal anxiety produces panic and fear 
that are normal given the level of perceived anticipatory threat generated by the pathological anxiety. Figure 
modified and updated from McNaughton (2005). 
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Figure 4: Syndromal comorbidity and positive feedback between anxiety and panic. Abbreviations and 
symbols as in Figure 2. Genetic and or environmental predisposing factors (particularly those linked to 
neuroticism) can result in pathological activity in both the PAG, generating panic, and in the hippocampus and 
amygdala, generating anxiety. These can concurrently reinforce each other through the state feedback 
mechanisms detailed in Figure 2 and 3 (dashed outline filled grey double headed arrow) – resulting in positive 
feedback. Repetitive or chronic activation of either or both if the FFFS and BIS (and particularly the resultant 
release of stress hormones, see Figure 5) can result in a progressive sensitisation of the other system (‘kindling’) 
and this can also generate longer-term trait positive feedback (circular arrows). Not only does this imply that 
symptomatic comorbidity can result in trait comorbidity but it implies that therapeutic intervention at any one of 
the main links in these positive feedback circuits can produce some improvement. Figure modified and updated 
from McNaughton (2005). 
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Figure 5: Pathways for comorbidity beyond the FFFS and BIS. A selection of sources of potential 
interaction between the FFFS/BIS – primarily the amygdala (AMYG) and hippocampus (HIP) and other 
systems are shown. Solid lines represent net excitatory connections, dashed lines represent net inhibitory 
connections. Of most immediate relevance to the long term trait changes of Figure 4 are the interactions with the 
stress system. Anxiety is a stressor, releasing corticosterone/cortisol (CORT) via activation of the 
paraventricular nucleus (PVN), release of corticotrophin releasing factor (CRF) and adrenocorticotropic 
hormone (ACTH). Importantly, negative feedback control of the release of CORT is achieved by its action on 
HIP and its connection with PVN. High levels of CORT can damage the hippocampus, reduce this feedback 
inhibition, and so result in progressive increases in CORT. Continuously high CORT can then result in 
depression (see text) as well as other problems. CORT will also reduce the effects of endogenous anxiolytic 
action mediated by 5HT1A and GABAA (particular benzodiazepine site) receptors. At least in the short term, 
5HT1A activation release CORT but benzodiazepine activation inhibits it. (Both of these effects show 
tolerance.) The GABAA system is particularly important for comorbidity as it not only reduces anxiety (without 
tolerance) but also produces muscle relaxation, euphoria, and rewarding effects via endogenous opiate systems 
(OPI) that cause the release of dopamine (DA). These effects show tolerance and lead to addiction. Thus use of 
anxiolytics can lead to substance use disorder (SUD) and, via tolerance and withdrawal, SUD can result in 
anxiety disorder (see text).  
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